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Abstract 
Purpose:  
This article will explore whether, although the State has a duty to protect prisoners, there 
should nevertheless be a right for prisoners to decide when and how they die. 
Approach: 
Utilising a utopian thought experiment, the article covers a series of interrelated issues: the 
aims of punishment, the functions of prisons, the rights of prisoners, and the responsibilities 
of the State towards inmates. While the article takes a European focus, it is of interest to a 
global audience, as the philosophical ideas raised are universally applicable. 
Findings:  
As the right to die advances in society, so should it advance for prisoners. Once assisted 
dying has been legalised, it should also be available for dying prisoners. 
Originality:  
The question has so far not been analysed in depth. With an ageing prison population, 
however, it is vital that we start engaging with the problems posed by an ageing and dying 
prison population. 





Death is a given. While we are aware that our days are limited, it is a truth we try not to dwell 
upon. As long as we are healthy and (relatively) young, it is easy to ignore. And when 
thoughts of mortality creep up we can try to push them aside with the hope of dying 
peacefully and without pain in our sleep, at the end of a long, fulfilled life. Sadly, few people 
experience this type of death.1 In order to alleviate suffering and/or to avoid an undignified 
death, some individuals prefer to end their lives self-determinately, either through suicide or 
through a form of assisted dying. However, while all European countries apart from Cyprus 
have decriminalised suicide, only four (Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland) permit some form of legal ‘assisted suicide’. 
The question whether prisoners should be granted a right to die raises three complex, 
interrelated questions. How far can society’s interest in punishment go, where does the duty 
of the State to protect prisoners end, and what are the specific rights of prisoners? This last 
question leads to further ones: To what extent do and should prisoners have personal 
autonomy? What does ‘dignity’ mean in the context of prisoners’ treatment?  How ‘dignified’ 
should prisoners’ treatment be? 
This article is a utopian thought experiment. Few European jurisdictions are close to 
implementing a ‘right to die’ for citizens, and they are even further away from a ‘right to die’ 
for prisoners. But that does not mean we should not engage with the idea. When we engage in 
utopian thinking, considering what our society could and should look like, we can come 
across and highlight shortcomings and problems of the status quo. As Hedrén puts it: 
Utopian thought has the potential to work as an impulse or a driving force, 
inspiring development activities at many levels. The more concrete the forms are 
that it takes, the more it will stimulate reflections on the opportunities and 
                                                          
1 “There is a major mismatch between people’s preferences for where they would like to die and their actual 
place of death. Our research shows that around 70% of people would prefer to die at home, yet around 50% 




shortcomings linked to what is conceived to be achievable measures and optional 
development paths. (2009, p. 221) 
In Lawlandia’s prison HMP Noplace, a new approach to prisoners’ rights has been 
introduced. New prisoners proceed through reception and induction as usual, with only one 
difference: after a mental health assessment, those deemed ‘healthy’ are offered a cyanide 
pill and told that they have the choice to take that pill if ever they decide to die. Those not 
wanting to be resocialised, not wanting to sit through their punishment, not looking forward 
to life after prison now have a way out…  
This question about a right to die for prisoners touches on a variety of issues: the extent of 
prisoners’ rights, the purposes of punishment, the aims and functions of prisons, and the 
interrelationship between all three. As such, it is a timely and important issue to consider. 
This paper will argue that a blanket ban on a prisoner’s right to die does not adequately 
respect the prisoner’s right to dignified treatment.  
The article is in five sections. First, the approaches towards a right to die in general and 
assisted dying in Europe in particular will be outlined, as well as the conflicting notions 
behind a right to die for prisoners. Second, the prisoners’ rights will be considered, especially 
the retention of autonomy and dignity and the idea of resocialisation. Next, the idea of 
punishment will be investigated before turning to the State’s responsibility towards prisoners 
and introducing two further complications, namely the vulnerability of the prisoner and the 
need for capacity when deciding over one’s death. Lastly, it will be explored what a change 
in the law should look like. While the conflicting interests make the possibility of a right to 
die in prison even more problematic than a right to die for those who are not in prison, this 




1. Setting the Scene:  
1.1. A Right to Die in Europe 
Over the past decades, assisted dying has been a hotly debated topic across Europe, due to its 
highly moral and sensitive nature and the rising recognition of a need for legal change.2 Even 
in the very few countries that have legalised assisted dying to date, the precise scope of 
assisted dying remains controversial.  
If we accept the idea of the human being as autonomous and free,3 then he or she should also 
be free to make decisions about his or her own life, even if they are detrimental to health and 
even life. This idea is generally accepted in so far as patients are allowed to refuse treatment, 
even if that endangers or ends their lives.4 The logical next step would be accepting a right to 
die and a right to be helped to die when lacking the necessary physical capacity to end their 
lives in the way they desire. In theory, autonomous choices should be respected and active 
assisted dying would serve to maintain independence until death (Biggs, 2001, p. 105). 
According to Nietzsche (‘Nietzsche on Death: From Thus Spoke Zara Thustra’, 1972, p. 313) 
for example, we have the freedom to want to die at the right time. To him, death should be a 
free act, happening at a chosen, right time. Suicide, therefore is an option of human autonomy 
(Baumann, 2001, p. 294). Taking that thought further, if autonomy meant we were allowed to 
commit suicide, then it should also be available to those requiring assistance. As Battin put it, 
                                                          
2 See for example the debates in Parliament on various Assisted Dying Bills, e.g. Hansard Vol 658, Wednesday 
10 March 2004; Hansard Vol 681, Friday 12 May 2006, Hansard Vol 755, Friday 18 July 2014. See also debates 
at the Deutscher Juristentag (German Jurists Forum), criminal law division, regarding a right to die and an 
Alternativentwurf (alternative draft) for a law regulating assisted dying in 1986 and 2005. 
3 Autonomy as a philosophical concept found different interpretation over the centuries. It started out being 
applied to the Greek city-state, denoting its independence. Its scope was then extended, initially by religious 
thinkers, to also cover humans. (See Dworkin, G,  1988). According to the libertarian view on autonomy, 
postulated by for example Mill and Singer, autonomy is the right to have own choices in life respected, and the 
duty not to interfere with those of others. (See Foster, 2009). According to Foster (2009), there are four ways 
in which the label autonomy is being used: in the Kantian sense of acting completely rationally, as the ideal of 
living a self-determined life, as a reason for constraint, and as an evaluation which determines whether respect 
is required.  
4 See for example Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449. 
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“control of one’s own death as far as possible is a matter of fundamental human rights” 
(1994, p. 165).  
The main arguments against legalising assisted dying and recognising a right to die are the 
need to protect vulnerable members of society, the fear of a ‘slippery slope’ and the sanctity 
of life (see for example Dworkin R, 1993 and Jackson and Keown, 2012). The other side of 
the argument tends to focus on autonomy and dignity in arguing for the liberty to choose 
when and how to die (see for example Biggs, 2001 and McLean, 2007). It is vital to 
differentiate between autonomy and dignity and not to see them as interchangeable 
catchphrases. As will be seen below, both play a vital role in imprisonment. 
A further complicating factor in legalising assisted dying is the fact that a wish to die, 
whether in prison or within society, is often seen as a symptom of a mental illness, requiring 
treatment in a psychiatric hospital. The view point is that no one without a mental illness 
would wish to die.5 However, a wish to die should not be simply dismissed as symptom of a 
mental illness but should be carefully and objectively examined by medical practitioners 
trained in that area. Furthermore, while wanting to die can be a symptom of a mental illness, 
it is problematic to instantly preclude anyone with a mental illness from receiving assistance 
in dying, as their suffering can be acute and unbearable, as well (see for example the case 
Haas v Switzerland, application no. 31322/07). 
Assisted dying has been decriminalised in different forms in only four European countries: 
Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland. In Belgium, physician-assisted 
dying was legalised in 2002.6 A patient has the right to receive assistance in dying if they are 
                                                          
5 Studies show that a vast majority of those committing suicides are in fact suffering of a mental health 
condition (see for example Cavanagh et al, 2003).  
6 Belgium has the most liberal approach when it comes to assisted dying. In 2014, the case of Frank van den 
Bleeken made it into national and European media, as the Belgian serial rapist and murderer asked for an 
assisted death. Frank van den Bleeken had been imprisoned for more than 30 years following convictions for 
rape and rape-murders. While in 2014 his wish to die had been granted by the Belgian minister of justice, this 
was cancelled in 2015 and he was moved to a psychiatric prison ward, awaiting referral to a specialist facility in 
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“in a medically futile condition of constant and unbearable physical or mental suffering that 
can not [sic] be alleviated”.7  Since 2014, Belgium also has a law in place enabling euthanasia 
for children. There is no age limit in place, as long as the parents consent to the procedure.8 
In Luxembourg, physician-assisted suicide and assisted dying were legalised in 2009.9 The 
patient has to be terminally ill and suffering unbearably, either from a mental or a physical 
health condition. In the Netherlands, the Penal Code was amended in 2002 to legalise 
physician-assisted dying and suicide in cases of lasting and unbearable suffering.10 In 2004, 
the Groningen Protocol promoted the availability of assisted dying to children under the age 
of 12. As this is not a law, the Groningen Protocol does not give physicians legal protection. 
So far, physicians are protected from prosecution as long as they act in accordance with the 
protocol, but no black-letter law exists in this area. In the Swiss Penal Code, assisted suicide 
is only prohibited if it is carried out for ‘selfish motives’.11 What is required is that the final 
act lies with the person wishing to die, meaning that they have to be able to take the deadly 
medication themselves (see for example Reiter-Theil et al, 2018). 
As this highlights, there is not yet a general right to die. If assistance is required, this is only 
available in four European countries and only within more or less strict parameters. Apart 
from possibly in Belgium and the Netherlands, where access to assisted dying is based on 
unbearable suffering but not necessarily terminal illness, prisoners do not fall within those 
parameters, unless they are terminally ill. Excluding prisoners from access to assisted dying 
can be supported by various interests in imprisonment, like the need for punishment and the 
State’s duty of care. However, this article will demonstrate why a prisoner should have a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the Netherlands. Van den Bleeken wished to die as he saw himself as a threat to society and did not want to be 
released, but equally could not stand the thought of remaining in prison. 6 See 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/belgium/11098247/Belgium-grants-murderers-request-
for-mercy-killing.html, and http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/belgium/11327541/Belgian-
serial-rapist-will-not-be-euthanised-as-planned.html, accessed 26 February 2018. 
7 The Belgian Act on Euthanasia of May, 28th 2002, Section 3, §1. 
8 Act amending the Act of 28 May 2002 on euthanasia, sanctioning euthanasia for minors, 2014. Belgian 
Official Gazette, number 2014009093: 21053. 
9 Loi du 16 mars 2009 sur l'euthanasie et l'assistance au suicide, Article 2. 
10 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act, April 1, 2002. 
11 Swiss Criminal Code 1942, Article 115. 
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(limited) right to die to enable access to assisted dying, just like every individual with 
capacity who is not imprisoned should.  
 
1.2. Conflicting Issues in Imprisonment 
When we contemplate a right to die for prisoners, it is easy to think in polarised terms: either 
treat prisoners with the same dignity as all others are treated, and enable autonomous 
decisions with some limits based on loss of liberty but including a right to die, or restrict 
autonomy legitimately as a proper and inevitable result of imprisonment. And with that we 
already have two of the three competing interests: prisoners’ rights and the idea of 
punishment. But there is a third component to complicate matters further, namely, the State’s 
responsibility towards individuals under its care. 
The main argument against giving prisoners a right to die is that imprisonment’s first and 
foremost purpose is punishment – though it should be highlighted that imprisonment is seen 
as being the punishment itself, not as giving room for further punishments (see for example 
Paterson, 1951). Thus, what stands in the way of letting prisoners choose the time and 
manner of their own death, is society and the victims’ interest in seeing an offender punished. 
At the same time, prisoners do keep most of their human rights on imprisonment, bar the 
right to liberty and possibly other rights that might need to be restricted, which might, for 
example, be necessary in the name of security.12  
One problem when thinking of a possible right to die of prisoners is that the failure to prevent 
a prisoner from committing suicide amounts to a human rights violation, as the State has 
neglected its duty towards the prisoner. This makes an autonomous death wish highly 
problematic. 
                                                          
12 For example, the right to privacy can be limited in searching cells and monitoring correspondence.  
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The following sections will analyse each argument in turn, starting with the rights of 
prisoners.13 
 
2. The Rights of Prisoners 
2.1. Imprisonment for Resocialisation 
There are generally two ways in which we can view imprisonment: retributivism, which will 
be considered below, and utilitarianism. Following a utilitarian approach, punishment has the 
aim of preventing reoffending through deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation (see 
Easton and Piper, 2016, p. 8). Imprisonment then focuses more on the future of the offender 
(not reoffending), than on the past (the wrongdoing).  
HMP Noplace in Lawlandia makes no attempts at rehabilitation. The prisoners are not 
offered any education, any training or any therapy, but they enjoy a certain ‘freedom’ in 
prison. In HMP Noplace, prisoners can chose their own mealtimes, have access to the sports 
facilities, showers, and a library whenever they want and can choose their cell partner.  
While this approach by HMP Noplace in Lawlandia might seem appealing to some, given 
either the relative level of autonomy granted to prisoners or the incapacitation of the offender, 
it is doubtful how successful this approach would be in relation to most aims behind 
imprisonment – deterrence, punishment, and resocialisation. A mere focus on incapacitation 
does not seem sufficient as a rationale behind imprisonment.  
The punishing element of a sentence – i.e., taking away someone’s physical liberty – and 
retribution should not exist as the sole elements of imprisonment. In order to ensure a 
dignified existence in prison, the aim of resocialisation has to be present. As stated by 
                                                          
13 Due to the word restraints of this article, the arguments will only be briefly introduced to highlight the 
complexity of the problem. 
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McCorkle and Korn, “‘resocialisation’ implies changes in group memberships” (1954, p. 88). 
For this to be possible, prisoners need to be provided with a number of opportunities to help 
achieve the aim. Be that the starting point of a structured day-to-day life, offers of therapy, 
treatment for medical conditions, or work and leisure activities. 
Resocialisation can be seen as an aspect of rehabilitation (see for example Canton, 2017, pp. 
102ff). While rehabilitation can generally encompass a variety of aspects, including reform 
and penance (Martufi, 2018, p. 673), resocialisation focuses on social integration. As Rotman 
stated, it aims to “reintegrate [the prisoner] into society as a useful human being” (1990, p. 6). 
Rehabilitation is, on the one hand, a right the prisoner has. This is a view stressed for 
example by the ECtHR in its jurisprudence on prisoners’ rights (see for example Martufi, 
2018). At the same time, it is an interest the State pursues in order to prevent prisoners 
reoffending (see for example Lewis, 2005, p. 123).   
Resocialisation can only work if the prisoner actually wants to become a ‘functioning 
member of society’ or change their group membership; nobody can be forced to participate in 
programs aimed at resocialisation. Still, it is an aim the State has to follow. Resocialisation is 
strongly connected to viewing the prisoner as a fellow human being with rights, upholding 
their dignity and strengthening their autonomy.  
 
2.2. Autonomy  
Despite being deprived of their liberty, prisoners retain personal autonomy in prison. 
Naturally, not all rights can be retained, nor can a full level of autonomy, as imprisonment 
has more aims than just forcing a prisoner to live in a more confined setting, such as for 
example penance. Nonetheless, there are basic rights that remain.  
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Initially, the idea of a prisoner retaining any level of autonomy might seem ludicrous. After 
all, autonomy can be seen to be an aspect of liberty and liberty is automatically, visibly, and 
purposefully forfeited in imprisonment. However, physical liberty is only one element of 
autonomy; in order for a dignified existence in prison, other elements of autonomy need to be 
upheld. This can take the form of choosing who to associate with during times in the 
courtyard, being able to take part in parkrun if it is being offered within the prison, deciding 
when to shower, and who to call. All these decisions – and many more – are an element of 
upholding individual autonomy within the prison walls. This level of autonomous decision-
making is vital for upholding one’s identity within prison. Despite forfeiting physical liberty 
and having to live in accordance with strict prison rules, other liberties should remain. 
One of the most fundamental questions when it comes to living one’s life is how we wish to 
end it. Most of us will wish to live it until its natural end but that is not true for everyone. 
Many of us wish to have the option of deciding when our life has nothing more to offer or has 
become so unbearable that we would rather end it. Based on the retention of autonomy as part 
of their human rights, this is a freedom prisoners should retain.  
In addition to a prisoner’s autonomy, what needs to be upheld at all costs is the prisoner’s 
dignity. 
 
2.3. Dignity  
Dignity as an international legal concept dates back to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, however, its origins as a legal concept can be said to go back to 1789, at the domestic 
(French) constitutional level (see Dupré, 2013, p. 117). After the Second World War, dignity 
began to appear in the newly emerging international human rights documents (and national 
constitutions, like that of Germany) as a reaction to the atrocities of the war (see Chapman, 
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2011, p. 5). While the lack of definition of dignity leads to plenty of criticism concerning its 
use,14 according to Chapman (2011, p. 5) and McCrudden (2008, p. 678), said lack helped in 
that every State involved in drafting and applying the documents could agree to it and then 
fill it with their own meaning.  
While dignity is difficult to define, we accept that every human being possesses dignity, 
regardless of status, health, mental capacity, age, or other arbitrary criterion. Based on equal 
human rights, and the fact that dignity is the foundation of those rights, everyone should have 
their dignity equally protected. What is required is the protection of dignity “even in 
situations where the law is at its most forceful and its subjects at their most vulnerable” 
(Waldron, 2012, p. 218). 
Dignity is a vital element in imprisonment. The dignity of a prisoner is easily threatened – by 
lack of privacy, the potential of degrading treatment by prison staff, the lack of activity to 
keep oneself occupied, to name just a few. Some would even go as far as claiming that “the 
entire process of prison is designed to destroy the last remnants of the dignity of the 
individual” (Singer, 1972, p. 669).  The preamble to the European Prison Rules (EPR) 2006 
stresses that:  
[T]he enforcement of custodial sentences and the treatment of prisoners 
necessitate taking account of the requirements of safety, security and discipline 
while also ensuring prison conditions which do not infringe human dignity and 
which offer meaningful occupational activities and treatment programmes to 
inmates, thus preparing them for their reintegration into society.  
                                                          
14 See for example McCrudden (2008: 655), who claimed that “the use of ‘dignity’, beyond a basic minimum 
core, does not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial decision-making in the human rights 
context, in the sense that there is little common understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or 
across jurisdictions”. See also Kuhse (2000: 74), stating that “[dignity] is a slippery and inherently speciesist 
notion, it has a tendency to stifle argument and debate and encourages the drawing of moral boundaries in the 
wrong places”.  
12 
 
This links directly to the first article of the EPR, which states that “All persons deprived of 
their liberty shall be treated with respect for their human rights”. The UN’s resolution on 
Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners also includes dignity as a necessity in 
imprisonment: “All prisoners shall be treated with the respect due to their inherent dignity 
and value as human beings” (UN GA Resolution 45/111, para [1]).  
When contemplating the dignity of prisoners, this is linked to, yet different from, autonomy. 
Being treated with dignity makes the retention of a level of autonomy necessary. In order to 
lead a dignified life, some control over one’s existence is crucial. But dignity requires more 
than a certain degree of autonomy. What is required is the room to uphold one’s identity, 
being recognised as an individual with needs and boundaries. This also requires minimising 
aspects of prison life that are deemed to be undignified.  
Dignity is often used as an argument for the need to legalise assisted dying, in order to 
prevent an undignified existence or undignified death. When aiming at upholding dignity in 
prison, the issues surrounding a dignified death cannot be ignored. With an ageing prison 
population comes an increase in illnesses and potentially death. A dignified death of prisoners 
consequently becomes increasingly topical.  
However, there are also other ways of seeing imprisonment. Usually, it is seen to be a 
combination of resocialisation, deterrence, protecting society from dangerous individuals, as 
well as the loss of physical liberty as punishment. This last element is the one that stands in 
starkest contrast to giving prisoners rights and freedoms and is, therefore, essential to 
consider when contemplating a right to die for prisoners. 
 
3. Imprisonment as Punishment  
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Following retributivist theories (see for example Von Hirsch, 1976), imprisonment is 
punishment for the wrongdoing. A vital element is that punishment has to be seen to be done. 
As such it serves both the interest of the State and that of the victims. As Feinberg puts it, 
Punishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment 
and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, either on the 
part of the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose name’ the 
punishment is inflicted. (1965, p. 400)  
Consequently, the type and onerousness of sentence communicates censure in proportion to 
the seriousness of the offence. Allowing or facilitating a prisoner’s suicide undermines or 
even negates the expressive function of punishment.  
In HMP Noplace, prisoners are not only not offered means to rehabilitate themselves, they 
are furthermore stripped of as many rights and freedoms as possible, to ensure that the fact 
that imprisonment is a punishment is felt by the prisoners on a daily basis, as well as being 
communicated to the outside world. There are no visiting hours, let alone conjugal visits, no 
right to speak to the outside world via telephone, no right to vote and no right to a 
meaningful pastime.  
The case for restricting prisoners’ rights in the name of punishment is compelling, but that 
cannot guide the entire structure and aims of prison life or the nature of the State’s 
obligations towards prisoners. This paper will argue that while punishment is a vital element 
of imprisonment, achieved through the forfeiting of physical liberty, other factors can 
override this after a certain period of time, giving the prisoner more autonomy to make 
fundamental decisions over his or her life. 
Based on a retributive view of imprisonment, one of the main issues with allowing a prisoner 
to die is that it undermines the aims of punishment for wrong doings. We do not want them to 
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take an easy way out, cutting their punishment short. While dying of a natural death or 
through violence at the hand of someone else might also cut the sentence short, this is 
different than having the option of cutting it short oneself, as it is a non-voluntary death. 
Retributivism demands that punishment must be proportionate to the wrong doing. Connected 
to that, or seen as an aspect of it, is the idea that punishment has to be seen (see Skillen, 
1980). One of the underlying ideas is that “‘retributive suffering’ […] can express and 
promote human responsibility” (Skillen, 1980, p. 523). Furthermore, it can be argued, that in 
contrast to the other goals of punishment – deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation – 
retribution is “the sole penal rationale concerned exclusively with doing justice” (Pugsley, 
1979, p. 381). Through punishment, retributivism seeks to address the injustice that had been 
caused by the offender. As individuals are responsible for their behaviour, actions or 
omissions that go against the codes of a society require punishment (see Pugsley, 1979, p. 
398). The idea is not inflicting punishment, i.e. taking away someone’s physical liberty, to 
achieve a greater good, like deterrence or resocialisation, but inflicting punishment in 
proportion to the offence. According to Kant, this means treating the offender not as an 
object, but as a subject (see Kant, 1965, pp. 99-109). Furthermore, through retributive 
punishment, the laws and values of a society find affirmation (see Pugsley, 1979, p. 402). 
Consequently, imprisonment cannot actively be cut short: the timespan needed for retribution 
has to be fulfilled. A voluntary death would, therefore, take part of the retribution away. 
But is that really how it is? Is being dead taking an easy way out? If we see imprisonment 
purely as a punishment, then yes. This is also an argument against the death penalty: 
execution actually stops the pain that the offender is meant to endure by way of punishment. 
A lot of prisoners serving a life sentence might prefer death. Punishment through being 
imprisoned consists in denying them the choice: denying them the opportunity to forego pain. 
That is also important if we see punishment as a form of penance: 
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The penance theory informs us that punishment is a communicative act directed 
at the offender as a rational, autonomous agent. Punishment aims to convince him 
that his conduct deserves moral blame, that he should repent and restore his 
damaged relations with the community. (Lipkin, 1988, p. 89) 
What the idea of penance presupposes is the prisoner as an autonomous, rational agent. 
Penance alone is not enough to justify imprisonment (see Lipkin, 1988, p. 94), nevertheless it 
is an additional element of imprisonment as punishment. 
If we see imprisonment as a means to rehabilitate and re-socialise, then punishment is not 
necessarily the principle purpose of imprisonment. Imprisonment in order to turn the prisoner 
into a law-abiding member of society (again) only works when the prisoner actually wishes 
for this to happen. Alternatively, he will simply ‘do time’ without any gain apart from society 
feeling reassured that he is being punished. Admittedly, this reassurance is needed, as public 
confidence in criminal justice is important and it is inherent in our notions of justice that 
someone should suffer in response to blameworthy behaviour.  
In addition to the punishing element of imprisonment, we need to consider the State’s role in 
imprisonment, especially its duty to protect individuals under its care. 
 
4. State’s Duty to Protect: No Voluntary Death in Prison 
The duty of States to safeguard prisoners from harm arises from the prisoner’s state of 
vulnerability.  
Lawlandia has strict mechanisms in place to protect the inmates in HMP Noplace. Prisoners 
have to undergo a monthly mental health screening, and have to report back about the other 
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inmates’ behaviour. Cells are designed not to give the opportunity to do harm to oneself, and 
no metal cutlery or tools are available to the prisoners.    
A reason behind preventing suicides in detention is that prisoners are vulnerable and in need 
of protection by the State. Admittedly, removing someone from their known environment and 
their support network, in addition to all the specifics of imprisonment,15 is likely to impact 
negatively on mental wellbeing. Being isolated from the outside while at the same time living 
in close proximity to complete strangers is a challenging setting.  
It is hard for prisoners to maintain their mental health and dignity when they are 
forced to defecate in front of strangers and eat in a lavatory. It is hard for 
prisoners – particularly for those who have experienced abuse as a child – not to 
be distressed by regular physical searches, or the less frequent but more intrusive 
strip searches which are part of maintaining security. (Rickford and Edgar, 2003, 
p. 26)  
Vulnerability in prison can have a variety of causes including personal incapacities, lack of a 
support network, and a disadvantaged social status (see for example Mechanic and Tanner, 
2007). While these do not necessarily render every individual experiencing them vulnerable, 
they can cause or heighten the sense of being vulnerable. As Mechanic and Tanner stated, 
“[v]ulnerability involves several interrelated dimensions: individual capacities and actions; 
the availability or lack of intimate and instrumental support; and neighbourhood and 
community resources that may facilitate or hinder personal coping and interpersonal 
relationships” (2007, p. 1222). The vulnerability of prisoners is not just due to the fact of 
being incarcerated, instead they “share multiple vulnerabilities, with large overrepresentation 
of racial minorities, people with mental illnesses, and people with little education and 
                                                          
15 Confinement in a small space, lack of individuality, lack of meaningful tasks, etc. 
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unstable work histories” (Mechanic and Tanner, 2007, p. 1224). Studies show that in prison 
72% of male inmates have at least two mental health issues (Rickford and Edgar, 2003, p. 
79).  
 
4.1. Vulnerability  
Even if there is no vulnerability in the individual as a precondition, it can arise out of the 
conditions of imprisonment, like the aggression and violence in prison leaving one to feel 
unsafe (see Ricciardelli et al, 2015, p. 496). In a study carried out by Ricciardelli et al (2015, 
p. 498) one of the findings was that a continuous risk of physical violence led to feelings of 
vulnerability. Additionally, the general lack of control creates vulnerability in that there is no 
stability or foreseeability as to what will happen the next day, week, month, or year (see 
Ricciardelli et al, 2015, p. 499). Focusing on the mental aspect of lack of autonomy, the study 
found that it can lead to anxiety and further the general vulnerability (see Ricciardelli et al, 
2015, p. 504). Furthermore, some groups of prisoners are especially vulnerable. For example, 
according to the Harris Review, “all young adults in custody are potentially vulnerable. This 
vulnerability is the result of a combination of their lack of maturity, their life experiences and 
their experiences in custody, particularly around the support they receive” (Harris and 
Browne, 2016, p. 41). As the State is inflicting this specific situation on an individual, the 
State is also responsible for their general wellbeing, keeping prisoners healthy, and protected 
from additional suffering.  
In addition to the mental health issues which can become more severe in prison, based on the 
added vulnerability, the State is under a duty to protect prisoners from their own rash wish to 
die once imprisoned. As a governor of a high security prison stated, many prisoners state to 
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prefer death over the prison sentence they are facing.16 After a while, though, prisoners 
become accustomed to the reality of prison life and the wish to die subsides. A prison 
governor in Switzerland told the story of one of his inmates, who tried committing suicide at 
an early stage of his sentence. Years later, he stressed how glad he was it had not 
succeeded.17 This demonstrates why giving a general right to die to prisoners, and allowing or 
even enabling suicides in prison, is not desirable. The drastic change to the prisoner’s life, by 
being catapulted out of ordinary life into a strictly confined and highly regulated setting, 
where the individual relinquishes not just freedom, but additional liberties, and in fact aspects 
of their individuality, causes a very real kind of vulnerability. 
 
 5. Now What? 
Lawlandia’s approach to a prisoner’s right to die, by giving every ‘healthy’ prisoner in HMP 
Noplace a cyanide pill to take at their heart’s desire, proves problematic. While it 
acknowledges the autonomy of the prisoner, as well as the need for the prisoner to have the 
mental capacity to make the decision, it only does so at the entry into the prison system. It 
thus ignores the problem of the effect imprisonment has on the individual, by increasing 
vulnerability and as such the duty of the State to protect those in its custody. Furthermore, it 
does not acknowledge the fact that an initial wish to die when entering prison most often 
subsides once the prisoner has adjusted to life in prison. A general right to die, therefore, does 
not seem feasible. 
In Lawlandia’s prison HMP Idealplace, a new approach to prisoners’ rights has been 
introduced. If a prisoner is suffering unbearably or is terminally ill and/or dying, receiving 
                                                          
16 Interview with a governor of a category A prison in England as part of a project funded by a 
Leverhulme/British Academy small research grant. 
17 Interview with a governor of a high security prison in Switzerland as part of a project funded by a 
Leverhulme/British Academy small research grant. 
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assistance in dying within the prison walls has become a possibility as an alternative to being 
transferred to a hospice. The assistance is being carried out within the prison walls, but by 
physicians who generally practice outside of prison. The same safeguards apply as outside of 
prison, including strict assessments by at least two physicians and psychiatrists to determine 
the capacity of the prisoner and the voluntary nature of the request.  
For assisted dying to be available in prison, once it has been generally legalised, specific 
additional safeguards have to be in place. As for non-prisoners, the voluntary nature of the 
wish for assistance has to be carefully established. Also, the unbearable suffering has to be 
determined by medical practitioners from outside the prison, to avoid potential abuse. 
Furthermore, the final act should be carried out in another setting than within the prison 
walls, be that a hospice or an assisted dying clinic, to eliminate the danger of the prison 
environment influencing the prisoner’s decision, as well as for transparency reasons. What 
should also be avoided is using assisted dying as a cheaper alternative to dying in a hospice. 
The prisoners’ wishes in this regard have to be upheld, based on the prisoners’ right to have 
their dignity respected.   
 
Conclusion 
As has been established, a right to die for prisoners is a utopian thought.  
Nevertheless, as the right to die advances in society, so should it advance for prisoners. Once 
assisted dying has been legalised, it should also be available for dying prisoners. This would 
uphold the need for the State to protect the prisoner, while at the same time acknowledging 
their dignity by enabling a dignified death. 
What has to be achieved first is a general right to die, enabling everyone to choose death over 
life. This should then be extended to a limited right to die in prison, making assisted dying 
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available in cases of unbearable suffering. This is required to protect the prisoners’ dignity in 
a highly sensitive moment of life.  
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